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This note summarizes some of the highlights of my longer paper with Guillermo 
Calvo”Fear of Floating.” Many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises. One 
view blames soft pegs for these crises.  Adherents to that view suggest that countries move to 
corner solutions--hard pegs or floating exchange rates. We analyze the behavior of exchange 
rates, reserves, and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is 
moving toward corner solutions. We focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are 
indeed doing so. We find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do 
not--there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the past few years, many countries have suffered severe currency and banking 
crises, producing a staggering toll on their economies, particularly in emerging market countries. 
 In many cases, the cost of restructuring the banking sector has been in excess of twenty percent 
of GDP and output declines in the wake of crisis have been as large as 14 percent. An 
increasingly popular view blames fixed exchange rates, specifically--soft pegs, for these 
financial meltdowns.  Not surprisingly, adherents to that view advise emerging markets to join 
the ranks of the United States and other industrial countries that have chosen to allow their 
currency to float freely.1 
.  The author thanks Guillermo Calvo and Vincent Reinhart for very useful discussions and 
Ioannis Tokatlidis for superb research assistance. 
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At first glance, the world--with the notable exception of Europe--does seem to be 
marching steadily toward floating exchange rate arrangements.  According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), ninety-seven percent of its member countries in 1970 were classified as 
having a pegged exchange rate; by 1980, that share had declined to thirty-nine percent and, in 
1999, it was down to only eleven percent.2 Yet, this much-used IMF classification takes at face 
value that countries actually do what they say they do.  Even a cursory perusal of the Asian 
crises countries’ exchange rates prior to the 1997 crisis would suggest that their exchange rates 
looked very much like pegs to the U.S. dollar for extended periods of time.  Only Thailand, 
however, was explicitly classified as a peg; the Philippines was listed as having a freely-floating 
exchange rate, while the others were lumped under the catch-all label of managed floating. 
In this note, I summarize some of the key findings of Guillermo Calvo and Carmen 
Reinhart (2000), who analyze the behavior of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, the 
monetary aggregates, and interest rates across the spectrum of exchange rate arrangements to 
assess whether the “official labels” provide an adequate representation of actual country practice. 
To illustrate some of the main points, I present evidence for a few regimes that are drawn from 
the analysis of  a much larger population of exchange rate arrangements.  The data spans 
monthly observations for thirty-six countries during the January, 1970-April 1999 period. 
Some of key findings are:  First, countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float 
mostly do not--there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.”  Relative to more 
committed floaters-- such as the United States, Australia, and Japan--observed exchange rate 
variability is quite low.  The low variability of the nominal exchange rate is not owing to the 
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absence of real or nominal shocks in these economies--indeed, relative to the United States and 
Japan most of these countries are subject to larger and more frequent shocks to their terms of 
trade, hardly surprising, given the high primary commodity content of their exports in many 
cases.  Second, the low relative exchange rate variability is the deliberate result of policy actions 
to stabilize the exchange rate.  Reserve volatility (contrary to what we should expect in the 
context of a floating exchange rate or relative to what we observe in the more committed 
floaters) is very high.  Third, interest rate volatility (both real and nominal) is significantly 
higher--and in a different league altogether--from that of the “true(r)” floaters. The high 
volatility in both real and nominal interest rates appears to have had two main explanations.  It 
suggests that countries are not relying exclusively on foreign exchange market intervention to 
smooth fluctuations in the exchange rates--interest rate defenses are commonplace. The high 
variability of interest rates also suggests that there are chronic credibility problems. Lastly, since 
countries that are classified as having a managed float mostly resemble noncredible pegs--the so-
called Αdemise of fixed exchange rates≅ is a myth. Instead, the fear of floating is pervasive, even 
among some of the developed countries.4 Our finding, that most of the episodes that come under 
the heading of floating exchange rates look more like noncredible pegs, may help explain why 
earlier studies, which relied on the official classifications of regimes, failed to detect important 
differences in GDP growth rates and inflation, across peg and the “floating” regimes.4 
In Section II, I present a brief review of what economic theory predicts for the behavior 
of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, the monetary aggregates, and interest rates across 
the spectrum of exchange rate arrangements. Section III confronts these theoretical priors with 
the actual data, while the concluding section discusses some of the reasons for “fear of floating.”  
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II. Basic concepts 
Let, i, i* denote the domestic and foreign nominal interest rate, respectively, while E is 
the nominal exchange rate.  The expected devaluation rate and default risk premia are given by ε 
and ρ, respectively, and R denotes the level of foreign exchange reserves.  The variance of any 
variable, x, is denoted by Var (x). 
Now let us first consider a floating exchange rate regime with a money supply rule, under 
which shocks to money demand, expectations about the exchange rate, or default risk are not 
accommodated. Under such circumstances, one should expect to see in the data that: Var(E) > 0; 
Var(i ) > 0, to the extent that there are shocks to the demand for money; and Var (R) = 0, as there 
is no central bank intervention. If, as in the United States, there is no explicit targeting of 
monetary aggregates, the exchange rate floats, and interest rates are smoothed, then shocks to 
money demand are accommodated, but shocks to exchange rate expectations or the default risk 
premia are not. In this case, Var(E) > 0, Var(i) = 0, Var (R) = 0, as money supply adjusts through 
open market operations rather than through purchases and sales of foreign exchange reserves. 
At the other extreme, if a country has a fully credible peg (which is defined to include the 
confidence that there would be no default), the interest rate parity condition is simply i = i*. In 
that case, we should expect: Var(E) = 0; Var(i) =Var(i *) because of full credibility, and; Var (R) 
> 0, as money demand shocks are accommodated.  Noncredible pegs, which include likelihood 
of default and are much more common, break down the one-to-one relationship between i and i*. 
 As before, the Var(E) = 0 and Var (R) > 0, but now the interest rate parity condition is given by 
equation (1), 
i = i* + ε + ρ (1). 
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Var(i) =Var(i *)+Var(ε) +Var(ρ) + covariance terms (2). 
Hence, lack of credibility implies that Var(i) >Var(i *). 
 However, as noted earlier, countries frequently depart from their stated exchange rate 
arrangements.  Pegs or quasi-pegs are not always made explicit.  One increasingly common form 
of  a-peg-in-disguise or Fear of Floating  (see Table 1) is when the exchange rate is stabilized 
through open market operations rather than through purchases and sales of foreign exchange.  
Examples of this type of arrangement include Peru since August 1990 and Mexico since 
December 1994.  Assuming imperfect credibility (since the arrangement is not made explicit), 
the implications are identical to that of the noncredible peg (i.e., Var(E) = 0, Var(i) 
=Var(i*)+Var(ε) +Var(ρ) + covariance terms) except Var(R) = 0.  If , despite having an 
announced float, the attempt to stabilize the exchange rate is less well disguised (as is the case of 
South Korea in 1999 up to the present) then, the predictions from theory are hardly 
distinguishable from a noncredible peg.  This case is depicted in Table 1 under the row “Fear of 
Floating II.” 
Table 1. Predicted Behavior Under Alternative Exchange Rate Arrangements 
 
Exchange rate arrangement 
 
Var(E) 
 
Var (i)  
 
Var (R)  
 
Float/ money supply rule 
 
high 
 
? 
 
0 
 
Float/ interest rate smoothing 
 
high 
 
low 
 
0 
 
Credible peg 
 
0 
 
Var (i*)  
 
? 
 
Noncredible 
peg 
 
0 
 
high 
 
high 
 
Noncredible quasi-peg in disguise 
(Fear of Floating-Type I) 
 
low 
 
high 
 
low 
 
Noncredible quasi-peg in less of a 
disguise (Fear of Floating II) 
 
low 
 
high 
 
high 
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Having reviewed the theoretical priors of what to expect from the behavior of exchange 
rates, international reserves and, interest rates across exchange rate regimes (which are 
summarized in Table 1), we proceed to confront these priors with the actual data.  
 
III. The evidence 
Our data is monthly for thirty six countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Western 
Hemisphere during the January, 1970-April 1999 period. Selected examples are presented here 
and the full range of episodes are given in Calvo and Reinhart (2000).  Countries are grouped 
into four types of exchange rate arrangements according to IMF classification: peg, limited 
flexibility, managed floating, freely-floating.  Limited flexibility has, almost exclusively, been 
used to classify European countries (prior to the monetary union) with exchange rate 
arrangements vìs-a-vìs one another (i.e., the Snake, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, etc.).  
Despite occasional bouts of foreign exchange market intervention, sometimes even in co-
ordinated fashion, the United States dollar (US $) floated about as freely against the German 
Deutschemark (DM) and now the euro and the Japanese Yen (−) as any currency is allowed to 
float.  For this reason, we compare countries that have regimes that are classified as freely-
floating or managed-floating against this “G-3” benchmark. Given well-defined priors for the 
behavior of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, the monetary aggregates, and interest 
rates across the spectrum of exchange rate arrangements, we proceed by examining these 
variables one at a time.  In what follows, we analyze monthly percent changes. 
Table 2 presents evidence of the frequency distribution of monthly exchange rate changes 
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(in percent).  For the United States, for example, less there is about a fifty-nine percent 
probability that the monthly US $/DM exchange rate change falls within a relatively narrow 
plus/minus two-and-a-half percent band.  By contrast, for Bolivia, Canada, and India (all declared 
floaters during that period), that probability is in the ninety-four-to-ninety-six percent range.5  An 
alternative way of stating the same facts is that there is only about a five percent probability in 
those countries that an exchange rate change will exceed  two-and-a-half percent on any given 
month (versus more than forty percent for the US $/DM). The absence of moderate-to-large 
monthly fluctuations in the exchange rate is equally absent among the so-called “managed float” 
episodes (Table 3).  For Egypt and Bolivia, the probability of a monthly exchange rate change 
greater than two-and-a-half percent is nil. Even for self-proclaimed flexible-rate advocates, such 
as Chile and Singapore, the frequency distribution of their monthly exchange rate fluctuations 
relative to the U.S. dollar do not vaguely resemble that of the US $/DM or US $/−, with a 
significantly higher proportion of observations falling within a narrow band.8   By this metric, 
post-crisis Mexico approximates a float more closely than any of the others--including Canada.   
 
 8 
 
Table 2. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Probability that the monthly percent 
change in nominal exchange rate falls 
within: 
 
Country 
 
Period
 
+/- 1 percent band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent 
band 
 
United States 
$/DM 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
 
26.8 
 
58.7 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
33.8 
 
61.2 
 
Bolivia 
 
September 1985-December 
1997 
 
72.8 
 
95.9 
 
Canada 
 
June 1970-April 1999 
 
68.2 
 
93.6 
 
India 
 
March 1993-April 1999 
 
82.2 
 
93.2 
 
Mexico 
 
December 1994-April 1999 
 
34.6 
 
63.5 
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 Table 3. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Managed” Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Probability that the monthly percent 
change in nominal exchange rate falls 
within:
 
Country 
 
Period
 
+/- 1 percent band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent 
band 
 
United States 
$/DM 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
 
26.8 
 
58.7 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
33.8 
 
61.2 
 
Bolivia 
 
January 1998-April 1999 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
Chile 
 
October 1982-April 1999 
 
45.5 
 
83.8 
 
Egypt 
 
February 1991-December 1998 
 
95.7 
 
98.9 
 
Pakistan 
 
January 1982-April 1999 
 
77.8 
 
92.8 
 
Singapore 
 
January 1988-April 1999 
 
61.5 
 
89.6 
 
As discussed in the previous section, however, exchange rates tell only part of the story.   
We cannot glean from exchange rates alone what would have been the extent of exchange rate 
fluctuations in the absence of policy interventions--that is, we do not observe the counter factual.  
To assess the extent of policy intervention to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations, we examine 
the behavior of foreign exchange reserves. As Table 1 highlights, the variance of reserves should 
be zero in a pure float. In reality, reserves may also change owing to changes in valuation. Table 
4 reports excerpts from the frequency distribution of monthly reserve changes (in U.S. dollars).  
With the exception of the United States, most countries in Table 4 hold the lion’s share of their 
foreign exchange reserve holdings in dollar-denominated assets, hence, valuation changes are not 
 an issue.  As Table 4 highlights, there is about a seventy-four percent probability that Japan's 
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monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves falls in a narrow plus/minus two-and-a-half percent 
band.  In the case of Mexico, there is only a twenty-eight percent probability that changes are that 
small, while in the case of Bolivia that probability is even lower.  Indeed for all other countries, 
large swings in foreign exchange reserves appear to be commonplace, consistent with a higher 
extent of intervention in the foreign exchange market--even relative to what is to be expected a 
priori from a freely floating exchange rate regime. 
 
Table 4. Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating”  
Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Probability that the monthly percent 
change in foreign exchange reserves 
falls within:
 
Country 
 
Period
 
+/- 1 percent 
band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent 
band 
 
United States 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
28.6 
 
62.2 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
44.8 
 
74.3 
 
Bolivia 
 
September 1985-December 1997 
 
8.1 
 
19.6 
 
Canada 
 
June 1970-April 1999 
 
15.9 
 
36.6 
 
India 
 
March 1993-April 1999 
 
21.6 
 
50.0 
 
Mexico 
 
December 1994-April 1999 
 
13.2 
 
28.3 
1 Reserves are in US dollars.  Since the US holds its reserves in foreign currencies, much of the 
fluctuations in these simply reflect valuation changes arising from fluctuations in the dollar. 
Policy intervention to smooth exchange rate fluctuations does not appear to be limited to 
transactions in foreign exchange markets.  While interest rates in the United States and Japan are 
predominantly set with domestic policy objectives in mind, interest rate policy in most of these 
other countries accord a much higher weight to the stabilization of the exchange rate.  It would 
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be difficult to justify the very high relative volatility of nominal and real interest rates in these 
countries on the basis of changes domestic “policy fundamentals,” as Table 5 makes plain. The 
probability that interest rate changes will be confined to a narrow plus/minus fifty-basis-point 
band for the United States is about eighty-two percent--even including the historically turbulent 
inflation stabilization period of the early 1980s.  For Japan, that probability is even higher. By 
contrast, during Mexico's “floating exchange rate” regime, there is only a nine percent 
probability that interest rate changes will be less-than or equal-to fifty basis points.  Such 
stability in interest rates seems to elude most emerging markets--even those with capital controls 
(such as India).  Indeed, major interest rate changes (by G-3 standards) appear to be the rule.  
While the probability that interest rates change by 500 basis points (five percent) on any given 
month is about zero for the United States and Japan, that probability is close to thirty percent for 
Mexico. A recent example of Mexico's use of high interest rates as a means to limiting exchange 
rate pressures (despite a slowing economy and an adverse terms-of-trade shock) comes from the 
aftermath of the Russian crisis in August of 1998. Nor is Mexico unique in this regard among 
emerging markets. Such interest volatility is not the byproduct of adhering to strict monetary 
targets in the face of large and frequent money demand shocks.  In effect, most of these countries 
do not have explicit or implicit money supply rules.  It is a combination of trying to stabilize the 
exchange rate (without giving the explicit signal that foreign exchange market intervention 
yields) and lack of credibility.6 
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Table 5. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating” 
 Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Probability that the monthly change in 
nominal interest rate falls within:
 
Country 
 
Period
 
+/- 0.25 percent 
 (25 basis points) 
 
+/- 0.5 percent 
(50 basis points)
 
United States 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
59.7 
 
80.7 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
67.9 
 
86.4 
 
Bolivia 
 
September 1985-December 1997 
 
16.3 
 
25.9 
 
Canada 
 
June 1970-April 1999 
 
36.1 
 
61.8 
 
India 
 
March 1993-April 1999 
 
6.4 
 
15.9 
 
Mexico 
 
December 1994-April 1999 
 
5.7 
 
9.4 
 
  
 IV.  “Fear of Floating” 
Going beyond superficial classifications and taking the wealth of evidence at hand, if 
results are any guide to the future, promises and statements by countries to move in the direction 
of a floating exchange rate may be devoid of real consequences.  There appears to be a 
widespread “fear of floating”  that is closely linked with credibility problems.   
The root causes of the marked reluctance by emerging markets to float their exchange 
rates are multiple.  When circumstances are favorable (i.e., there are capital inflows, positive 
terms-of-trade shocks, etc.), many emerging market countries are reluctant to allow the nominal 
(and real) exchange rate to appreciate.  This probably stems from fears of the “Dutch disease” 
type problems--loss of competitiveness and serious setbacks to export diversification.  When 
circumstances are adverse, the case against allowing large depreciations becomes, possibly, even 
more compelling. The fear of a collapse in the exchange rate comes from pervasive liability 
 
 13 
dollarization, as in most emerging markets the debt of both the government and the private sector 
are largely denominated in hard foreign currency.  For this and other reasons, devaluations in 
developing countries have a history of being associated with recessions--not export-led booms.  
Furthermore, the authorities may resist large devaluations because of their inflationary 
consequences and the credibility problems these may feed. 
If  “fear of floating” continues to be the serious policy issue it has been in the past, and if, 
as the stylized facts on interest rates suggest, lack of credibility remains a serious obstacle, then 
the only way to simultaneously avoid the “floating and credibility problems” may be full 
dollarization.  A corner solution indeed! 
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 Footnotes 
*  University of Maryland and NBER, 4113D Van Munching Hall, College Park, Maryland 
20742 
1. See, for example, Morris Goldstein, (1999). 
2.  Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (1995), make this point as well. 
3.  See Calvo and Reinhart (2000) for a fuller discussion of why there is fear of floating. 
4.  See Atish Ghosh, Anne-Marie Gulde, Jonathan Ostry, and Holger Wolf (1997). 
5.  These patterns are representative of a broader set of countries, see Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
6.  The results for real interest rates paint a similar picture; these are available from the author
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